Political and Economic Elites in Spain (1875-2000): a Network Analysis

Alvaro La Parra-Perez, Weber State University

Nineteenth-century Spain was characterized by the regime of praetorian politics described in Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies: general political instability (led by urban agitation); systematic intervention in government by military officers through coups and wars; feeble institutions and parties; and substantial elite turnover. Over time, policy-makers built a (weak) “rechstaat,” governed by a small bureaucracy and a set of “grand corps d’état” – operating under the stabilized polity that followed the liberal-conservative deal of 1876. After the rise of state-led development, those elites grew in power throughout the twentieth century. They constituted, jointly with the military and the central economic elites, the backbone of the Franco regime. In contrast to other transitions to democracy, Spain’s transition to democracy in 1975-78 did not include any lustration procedure: Franco-regime elites were never purged, and all its crimes were blanketed through a general amnesty law. The purpose of this article is to measure the degree of personal (and family) continuity in the high echelons of the Spanish state. We collect information on political and economic elites (deputies, nobility, and members of the boards of the most important firms and banks) for the period 1875-2000 in order to explore the connections between the political and economic spheres and the continuities and discontinuities across regimes.

No extended abstract or paper available